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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
CLEO B. MASON, 
Plaintiff-
Respondent, 
vs. 
WESTERN MORTGAGE LOAN 
CORPORATION, 
Defendant-
Appellant. 
Case No. 880070-CA 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
PETITION 
Pursuant to Rule 35a of the Rules of the Utah Court of 
Appeals, plaintiff-respondent Cleo B. Mason hereby petitions the 
Court for a rehearing of the above-entitled matter. 
The ground for this petition is that the Court erred in 
holding that defendant should be denied an award of prejudgment 
interest because she failed to specifically request such an 
award before the trial court. 
The undersigned counsel hereby certify that this Petition 
is presented in good faith and not for delay. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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ARGUMENT 
PLAINTIFF'S REQUEST FOR JUDGMENT 
SHOULD BE TREATED AS A REQUEST FOR 
AT LEAST PREJUDGMENT INTEREST. 
The facts of this case are set forth in this Court's 
opinion, a copy of which is attached hereto as Appendix MA". 
Plaintiff argued on appeal in this matter that any error of 
the trial court in awarding judgment interest was harmless, 
because plaintiff was entitled in any event to an award of 
prejudgment interest from the date of the wrongful disburse-
ments. This Court rejected that argument, holding that plain-
tiff was not entitled to prejudgment interest because she had 
not requested it at trial. This Court stated as follows: 
On appeal, Mason argues that under our 
holding in Fitzgerald v. Critchfield, 744 
P.2d 301 (Utah App. 1987), her failure to 
raise the issue of prejudgment interest at 
trial is "of no consequence" to her request 
on appeal. In £itzgerald, we held a party's 
"failure to specifically plead a request for 
prejudgment interest is of no consequence 
because 'the interest issue is injected by 
law into every action for the payment of 
past due money.1" Id. at 304 (quoting 
Lianell v. Berg, 593 P.2d 800, 809 (Utah 
1979)). Although Fitzgerald failed to 
request prejudgment interest in his original 
pleading, he did, contrary to Mason, request 
it at trial and the trial court so awarded. 
Mason v. Western Mortgage Loan Corporation, No. 880070-CA, slip 
op. at 2 n.l (Utah Ct. App. May 19, 1988). 
Plaintiff respectfully submits that the distinction between 
the timing of the request of interest in Fitzgerald is not 
materially different from the timing of the request in the 
instant matter, for at least two reasons: First, the request 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
for interest in Fitzgerald was not made until after trial. 
Second, where plaintiff requested interest at the post-judgment 
rate, there would have been no point in also requesting interest 
at the prejudgment rate. These arguments will be addressed in 
order. 
The trial in Fitzgerald occurred on March 22, 1984. (See 
Fitzgerald judgment, a copy of which is attached hereto as 
Appendix flBH.) The first time that prejudgment interest was 
requested in Fitzgerald was in the plaintiff's proposed Judgment 
and Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. (See page 3 of 
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Defendant's 
Objections to Proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Judgment, filed by the defendant in Fitzgerald, a copy of which 
is attached hereto as Appendix "C".) The trial court nonethe-
less awarded prejudgment interest, and this Court affirmed. 
Part of this Court's rationale for affirming the award of 
prejudgment interest was that a party should be awarded the 
relief to which she is entitled even if not requested in the 
pleadings. Fitzgerald, 744 P.2d at 304, (citing Butler v. 
Wilkinson, 740 P.2d 1244, 1263 (Utah 1987); Utah R. Civ. P. 
54(c)(1)). See also Arizona Title Insurance and Trust Co. v. 
O'Malley, 11 Ariz. App. 486, 484 P.2d 639, 648 (1971). 
It is, therefore, clear that plaintiff would have been 
entitled to an award of prejudgment interest had she requested 
it. Had she failed to request it and later discovered the 
error, she would have been entitled under Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b) 
3 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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to have the judgment amended to include the award of interest. 
Lucas v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 51 Hawaii 346, 461 P.2d 
140, 144 (1969).l Finally, had she made a request for pre-
judgment interest but erroneously requested a lesser amount than 
that to which she was entitled, she would have still been 
entitled to an award of the full amount. Martinez v. Jesik, 703 
P.2d 638, 639 (Colo. App. 1985). 
Plaintiff did not, however, specifically request an award 
of prejudgment interest, because she had requested and received 
an award of interest at the post-judgment rate. At least with 
respect to the period from the date of the first judgment 
(October 14, 1982) to the date of the second judgment (January 
6, 1986) , there would have been no point in also requesting an 
award of prejudgment interest. Plaintiff is accordingly 
xThe plaintiff in Lucas was awarded judgment against only 
one of two defendants, and appealed the failure to award 
judgment against both defendants. The appellate court remanded 
with instructions to enter judgment against both defendants. 
The appellate court did not, however, make any mention con-
cerning interest, because plaintiff had not requested an award 
of interest. 
On remand, the trial court entered judgment in accordance 
with the appellate decision. After the entry of the judgment, 
plaintiff requested, apparently for the first time, that the 
judgment include interest from the time of the first judgment. 
The trial court declined to make such an award, and the plain-
tiff again appealed. The Hawaii Supreme Court held that the 
trial court would not have had jurisdiction to award interest 
where such was not specified in the mandate from the prior 
appeal. The court commented, however, that the failure to 
request interest was a clear case of excusable neglect, and 
remanded for entry of an award of interest. 
4 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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entitled to recover at least prejudgment interest for that 
period.2 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff's request for interest at the post-judgment rate 
should be treated as a timely request for judgment at the 
maximum rate allowable, which under this Court's ruling is 10%. 
This case should be remanded with instructions reduce the award 
of interest from $6,789.86 to $5,536.80. 
DATED this 2nd day of June, 1988. 
JACKSON HOWARD, 
FRED D. HOWARD, and 
LESLIE W. SLAUGH, for: 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Respondent 
2Interest on the principal portion of the judgment 
($15,380.00) at 10% from October 12, 1982, through January 29, 
1986, is $5,536.80. 
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kECSf^EO 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
OOOOO 
MAY 2 0199B 
••#>••£"£. LEWIS & PETERS.^: 
Cleo B. Mason, ) 
) 
Plaintiff and Respondent, ) OPINION 
) (For Publication) 
v. ) 
) 
Western Mortgage Loan Corporation, ) Case No. 880070-CA 
) 
Defendant and Appellant. ) 
Before Judges Bench, Davidson and Orme. FJLED 
'^MMM&^-CP 
BENCH/ J u d g e : Tirr^th^y s.nea 
Clerk of the Court 
Defendant appeals from an award of judgment^ln^Sfy^W8 We 
reverse and remand. 
In 1977, plaintiff Cleo Mason entered into two loan 
agreements with defendant Western Mortgage Loan Corporation 
(Western) under which Western would provide approximately 
$54,000 for the construction of two houses. While Western 
disbursed $25,000 of the construction funds upon joint 
authorization of Mason and her general contractor, $29,000 was 
disbursed at the sole request of the contractor, without 
Mason's express authorization. Prior to completion of the 
homes, the loan funds were exhausted. Mason discharged the 
contractor and spent another $14,000 of her own funds to 
complete the houses. Mason then filed this action against 
Western, claiming the $29,000 disbursed without her 
authorization violated the terms of the loan agreements. 
Trial was held in January 1982. In its findings and 
conclusions dated October 14, 1982, the trial court found that 
although Western disbursed construction funds without Mason's 
authorization, Mason failed to prove said disbursements were 
not used for construction labor and materials. Since Mason 
failed to prove any damages, the court dismissed her action and 
entered judgment for Western. . 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Mason appealed the trial court's decision. The Utah 
Supreme Court held, as a matter of law, Mason had satisfied her 
burden of proving damages, and the burden was then on Western 
to show which of the unauthorized disbursements, if any, were 
incorporated into the two houses. The Court reversed the trial 
court's judgment and remanded for entry of judgment in Mason's 
favor in the amount of damages to be established at trial. See 
Mason v. Western Mortgage Loan Corp., 705 P.2d 1179 (Utah 1985). 
On remand, Mason conceded all but $15,380 of the wrongly 
disbursed $29,000 was used directly in the construction and 
proposed a judgment in that amount, plus interest from October 
14, 1982, the date of the original judgment for Western. Over 
Western's objections, the trial court entered judgment for 
Mason for the principal amount and interest requested. Western 
appealed both the award of damages and judgment interest. The 
parties filed cross-motions for summary disposition. The Utah 
Supreme Court summarily affirmed the damages award but reserved 
the issue of judgment interest. This case was subsequently 
transferred to this Court pursuant to R. Utah. S. Ct. 4A. 
On appeal, Western argues the trial court erred in 
awarding judgment interest from the date of the original 1982 
judgment for Western rather than the 1986 judgment for Mason. 
In her respondent's brief, Mason requests prejudgment interest 
dating from the 1977 disbursements. However, Mason failed to 
request prejudgment interest at trial and did not file a 
cross-appeal. We therefore decline to reach this issue on 
appeal. * James v. Preston, 746 P.2d 799 (Utah App. 1987); 
# Halladav v. Cluff, 739 P.2d 643 (Utah App. 1987).1 
The issue of whether a judgment following appellate 
remand bears interest from the date of its entry or from the 
1. On appeal, Mason argues that under our holding in 
Fitzgerald v. Critchfield. 744 P.2d 301 (Utah App. 1987), her 
failure to raise the issue of prejudgment interest at trial is 
"of no consequence" to her request on appeal. In Fitzgerald, 
we held a party's "fcajlurg^to specifically plead a requast^Jxxr 
ureiudqment interest is of no cpjag^quenc^Hb^cause 'the interest 
l^ii^j_s^ inj^ntjed^j^JLaw^ into ev^ryacFion for ^TfenPHymCTg^oT' 
^jp^iZ^s^mons^IP TgV""7r~TffT^uptirta LiQrieTrVr-3^rgrT93 
P.2d 800, 809 (Utah 1979)). Although Fitzgerald failed to 
request prejudgment interest in his original pleading, he did, 
contrary to Mason, request it at trial and the trial court so 
awarded. 
880070-CA 2 
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date of the prior adverse judgment that was reversed on appeal 
is one of first impression in Utah. Mason contends the Utah 
Supreme Court's decision in Hewitt v. General Tire and Rubber 
Company, 5 Utah 2d 379, 302 P.2d 712 (1956), should be 
controlling in the instant case. In Hewitt, the trial court 
granted defendant's motion for a directed verdict and set aside 
the judgment for plaintiff entered on a jury's verdict. The 
Utah Supreme Court reversed and ordered that the judgment for 
plaintiff be reinstated. On remand, the trial court disallowed 
interest from the date of the original entry of judgment. The 
Utah Supreme Court reversed the trial courtfs order denying 
interest, explaining "we see [no] good reason why plaintiff 
should lose his interest because defendant was able to convince 
the trial court to make an erroneous ruling." I£. at 382, 302 
P.2d at 714. 
Hewitt is factually distinguishable from the instant case. 
In Hewitt, there was a valid judgment on which plaintiff would 
have been entitled to interest had not the judgment been set 
aside. In the instant case, the original judgment was for 
Western, not Mason. In Hewitt, the Utah Supreme Court stated 
its reversal "reinstated" or "vitalized" the original 
judgment. In the instant case, Mason had no original judgment 
which could be reinstated or vitalized. As the issue raised in 
this appeal is one of first impression, we will review the 
decisions of other jurisdictions to aid in our determination. 
In StPCktPh Theatres, Ii)Ct v, P3lerPP, 55 Cal.2d 439, 360 
P.2d 76, 11 Cal. Rptr. 580 (1961), the Supreme Court of 
California held: 
A judgment bears legal interest from the 
date of its entry in the trial court even 
though it is still subject to direct 
attack. When a judgment is modified upon 
appeal, whether upward or downward, the 
new sum draws interest from the date of 
entry of the original order, not from the 
date of the new judgment. On the other 
hand, when 9 judgment frs reversed pn 
appeal the new award subsequently entered 
bv the trial court can bear interest only 
from the date of entry of such new 
judgment. 
360 P.2d at 78 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). The 
Stockton approach is now the majority rule in American 
jurisdictions. &££ Isaacson Structural Steel Co. v. Armco 
880070-CA 
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Steel, 640 P.2d 812, 817 n.12 (Alaska 1982). One reason in 
support of the majority rule is the original judgment, once 
reversed, is extinguished, thus leaving no judgment on which to 
accrue interest. Rexnord, Inc. v. Ferris, 69 Or. App. 146, 684 
P.2d 26 (1984) . 
The minority rule, as adopted by the Alaska Supreme Court 
in Isaacson, states, H[W]hen the trial court's judgment is 
erroneous, the judgment of the [appellate court] must take its 
place and plaintiff is entitled to interest from the date of 
the erroneous judgment.- 640 P.2d at 817 (quoting Thornal v. 
Caroill, Inc., 587 S.W.2d 384, 385 (Tex. 1979). See also 
Pascack Valley Bank and Trust Co. v. Ritar Ford Sales, Inc., 6 
Conn. Cir. Ct. 646, 295 A.2d 667 (1972). One reason these 
jurisdictions follow the minority rule is that they do not 
consider responsibility for a delay of payment as a factor in 
making an interest award; rather the interest award is in the 
form of compensation for the period that plaintiff remains 
"less than whole." Farnsworth v. Steiner, 638 P.2d 181, 185 
(Alaska 1981); Pascack Vallev, 295 A.2d at 668. 
We hereby adopt the majority rule that when a judgment is 
reversed on appeal, the new judgment subsequently entered by 
the trial court may bear interest only from the date of entry 
of that new judgment.2 The majority rule is in line with 
Utah R. Civ. P. 54(e) and R. Utah Ct. App. 32 (interest awarded 
only from entry of judgment). The minority rule and its 
reasoning, on the other hand, is contrary to Utah case law. 
See L & A Drywall, Inc. v. Whitmore Constr. Co., Inc., 608 P.2d 
626 (Utah 1980) (prejudgment interest represents amount awarded 
as damages due to opposing party's delay in paying amount owed 
under obligation). 
The trial court's award of judgment interest is reversed. 
The matter is remanded to the trial court for entry of an award 
2. Of course, in cases where prejudgment interest is available 
and has been timely requested, plaintiff would be entitled to 
prejudgment interest from the time her loss is fixed and 
accurately calculable until entry of the new judgment. 
Compensation is at a slightly higher rate of interest following 
entry of- judgment. £££ Utah Code Ann. § 15-1-1, -4 (1986). 
880070-CA 4 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
of interest at the statutory rate from January 31, 1986, the 
date of the new judgment. 
KLA,UM. IP, £ ^ J , 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
Richard '€'.' Davidson, Judge 
Gregory*. Or me, Judge 
880070-CA 5 
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BRIAN C. HARRISON 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
290 West Center 
Provo, Utah 84601 
Telephone: 375-2500 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JAMES FITZGERALD, 
-vs-
GALE CRITCHFIELD, 
Plaintiff, JUDGMENT 
Defendant. 
Civil No. 64,330 
This matter having come on regularly for hearing on the 
22nd day of March, 1984, Plaintiff appearing in person and by 
his attorney Brian C. Harrison, and the Defendant appearing in 
person and by his attorney Joseph Rust, and the Court having 
received the evidence of the parties and of witnesses, and the 
Court having entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law, and being fully advised in the premises, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
1. Plaintiff is entitled to Judgment against Defendant 
in the sum of $11,367.50 with said Judgment to bear interest at 
the rate of 10% per annum from April 19, 1983 until the entry of 
Judgment, after which time said sum shall bear interest at the 
legal rate of interest until paid. 
2. Plaintiff is entitled to Judgment against Defendant 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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r 
for costs of Court incurred; in this action in the sum of $35.00. rea/ 
DATED this J^ ^day of ^ 2 . * ^ » 1984' 
BY -THE <Ct)URT: ? 
V Robert Bullock 
District Court Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing 
Judgment to Joseph Rust at 2000 Beneficial Life Tower, 36 South 
State Street, Salt Lake City, UT 84111, postage prepaid, this 
/ff^ -day of QAAII , 1984. 
<g^^6 
f » * i t -v.* v/»AI~ I S5 
COUNTY OP UlftH J 
I. THE UNCfcaSIGNED. CLERK Of1 THI DISTRICT COUfJ 
Of UTAH COUNTY, UTAH, DO HEREBY CERTIFY THAT THI 
ANNEXED AND FOREGOING IS A TRUE AND FULL COPY Of 
AW ORDINAL DOCUMENT ON FILE IN MY OFFICE AS SUCH 
tSMK 
WITNESS MY HAND AND SEAL OP SAID COURT THIS 
&l^~bAV OF r ^-'ftS**' 
"KUAM f. HUISH/OBB ' y ' ..«££ 
^ / v 
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JOSEPH C. RUST 
CHARLES W. HANNA 
KESLER & RUST 
Attorneys for Defendant 
2000 Beneficial Life Tower 
36 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 355-9333 
m wfyi'Q 'n CJ 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JAMES FITZGERALD, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
GALE CRITCHFIELD, 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND 
AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT 
OF DEFENDANT'S OBJECT-
IONS TO PROPOSED FIND-
INGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW AND JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 64,330 
This memorandum of points and authorities is in 
support of defendant's objections to the proposed findings of 
fact and conclusions of law and proposed judgment, or in the 
alternative, defendant's motion to amend the findings and 
judgment. 
POINTS AND AUTHORITIES 
POINT I 
THE ONLY JUDGMENT RENDERED BY THE COURT 
WAS THAT THE $1 PER COW CONTRACT WAS IN EFFECT 
There was testimony given on both sides whether a 
contract was ever agreed to by which defendant's cattle would 
be fed by plaintiff at the rate of $1 per cow. The court has 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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concluded that the evidence supported such a contract. 
However, by reason of plaintiff's own testimony, the earliest 
such a contract could have been struck was sometime around 
January 15, 1983. 
The more important question is what the court found as 
a result of the evidence. The only thing stated by the court 
at the conclusion of the trial was that it found the $1 per cow 
arrangement in order and therefore held defendant Critchfield 
liable for $11,367.50. The court did not address the subject 
of the supposedly damaged hay, which according to the figures 
of plaintiff accounted to $1,200 and was included by him in the 
overall $11,367.50 being claimed. In addition, the court did 
not address whether the $1 per cow arrangement continued after 
the April 8 date, when it was very clear that defendant did not 
want to keep his cattle at plaintiff's farm. 
It is respectfully submitted that from plaintiff's own 
testimony his responsibilities in exchange for the $1 per cow 
was more than simply to feed the cows. He was to "take care of 
them." The testimony was ample that his fences were constantly 
broken down and not repaired, allowing the cattle to move 
freely to other parts of his farm. If plaintiff was to take 
care of the cattle, and if the cattle got out and trampled over 
other areas, or ate hay from stacks, that was the 
responsibility of plaintiff as part of his overall duties in 
caring for the cattle. Therefore, defendant should not be 
charged for any claimed loss to the hay but, at most, should be 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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charged only for $1 per cow per day as the court announced in 
its judgment at the conclusion of the case. 
In addition, the court did not specifically state for 
how long the $1 per day contract was in effect. It is 
submitted that the $1 per day contract was specifically 
terminated on April 8, if# as the court has determined, it was 
in existence prior to that time. Therefore, the maximum charge 
pursuant to plaintiff's own billing should be the sum of 
$8,926.50. 
POINT II 
PLAINTIFF DID NOT SEEK AND THE COURT 
DID NOT AWARD INTEREST 
Plaintiff's complaint did not seek interest. The 
court at the conclusion of the trial did not award interest. 
It is improper for that to be added in the Conclusions of Law 
or Judgment at this point. 
CONCLUSION 
The court found in favor of plaintiff and against 
defendant on the issue of a contract. It also found against 
defendant on the issue of the lost and dead cattle as raised in 
defendant's counterclaim. The court has apparently also found 
that plaintiff did not breach the contract by his failure to 
maintain the premises in a clean condition and his failure to 
keep the cattle in one fenced-in area without moving them onto 
other property. It is submitted that in light of the testimony 
before the court that defendant should not have to pay for the 
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alleged damaged hay, which was a factor totally under 
plaintiff's control, nor for the period the cattle were kept 
against defendant's will after April 8. In short, defendant 
would submit to the court that the maximum amount it should 
have to pay is $8,926.50, plus the costs of $35, but not 
interest prior to judgment, 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this X / day of March, 1984. 
KESLER & RUST 
t^e C*> Lot 
oserfh C. Rust 
Attorneys for Defendant 
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I hereby declare that I caused to be mailed a true and 
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FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND JUDGMENT in Civil No. 
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